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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 15 WNTER 1981 NUMBER 2
CONGRESSMEN IN COURT: THE NEW
PLAINTIFFS*
The Honorable Carl McGowan**
The last decade has seen the birth and the coming of age of a
new kind of lawsuit: one brought by a member of Congress chal-
lenging an action of the executive branch as injurious to some in-
terest he or she claims to have as a legislator. Senators and Repre-
sentatives, either singly or in small groups, have invoked the
judicial power for purposes such as forcing the executive to publish
as law a bill that had been the subject of an allegedly improper
pocket veto,' granting the House of Representatives the right to
vote on the cession of the Panama Canal,2 and continuing in effect
our mutual-defense treaty with Taiwan despite presidential action
purportedly terminating it.3 In these and other cases, the congres-
* The John A. Sibley Lecture in Law delivered at the University of Georgia School of
Law on October 15, 1980, revised and annotated for publication.
** Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2 Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978). This
case involved a challenge by members of the House of Representatives to President Carter's
transfer of the Panama Canal and other federal properties in the Panama Canal Zone to the
Republic of Panama. The President acted pursuant to a self-executing treaty which had
obtained the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate but which had not been submit-
ted to the House. The plaintiffs claimed that the House's consent was required under the
property clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, which gives Congress power to "dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other property be-
longing to the United States." The district court rejected the claim, and the court of appeals
affirmed in an opinion noteworthy both for its substantive holding and for its decision to
pretermit the standing question by determining the merits.
3 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), judgment vacated, 444 U.S. 996
(1979) (mem.).
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sional plaintiffs arguably attempted to circumvent the political
process by obtaining in court a remedy that could be obtained
from Congress.
Serious separation-of-powers questions inevitably accompany
any effort by members of the legislature to enlist the judiciary's aid
in a dispute with the executive. The issues involved typically are
poorly suited for judicial resolution. Moreover, any intrusion by
the judiciary into a dispute between its coequal branches seems
fraught with difficulties. The problems are multiplied when the
plaintiff could have obtained from Congress the substantial
equivalent of the judicial relief sought, because in such cases the
court is asked to intrude into the internal functionings of the legis-
lative branch itself.
These problems have troubled congressmen and judges alike. In
a lengthy discussion on the Senate floor two days after oral argu-
ment on the Taiwan treaty case in the court of appeals, several
Senators decried judicial-branch involvement in the dispute. Ma-
jority Leader Robert Byrd said that "treaty termination ...
should be resolved between the Senate of the United States and
the President. It should not be left to the judicial branch to decide
an issue we should confront here." Senator Jacob Javits was "very
unhappy. . . to see the procedures of the Senate and the relation-
ships between the Senate and the President under the Constitu-
tion determined by a court."5 Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., while
maintaining that Senate approval was required, declared it to be
"unfortunate.. .that the courts are involved in this."'
These comments coincided with those of a very distinguished
and uniquely qualified witness who earlier had testified by invita-
tion before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a sense of
the Senate resolution stating that Senate approval is required to
terminate any mutual-defense treaty. That witness was the Honor-
able Dean Rusk of the University of Georgia School of Law. Pro-
fessor Rusk said to the Committee:
I, myself, believe that the question of the continuing valid-
ity of a treaty, and especially a mutual defense treaty, is not a
matter for the courts. This is a political matter of the highest
4 125 CONG. REc. S16,684 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979).
& Id. at S16,689.
6 Id. at S16,691.
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importance, on which the courts have neither the competence
nor the responsibility. It is a question for the political
branches of the Government, and if there are differences be-
tween a President and a Congress, these differences should be
worked out and resolved by political processes.
The late Chief Justice Earl Warren visited our law school
shortly before his death and, on that occasion, reminded us
that if each branch of the Federal Government were to pursue
its own constitutional powers to the end of the trail, our sys-
tem simply could not function. It would freeze up like an en-
gine without oil ....
Judges have also been acutely aware of the problems inherent in
these suits. In a 1977 case holding that a member of the House of
Representatives lacked standing to complain of allegedly illegal
CIA activities and appropriations when his own legislative reform
proposals to this end had failed of enactment, Judge Wilkey noted
that expansive concepts of standing in this context "would lead in-
evitably to the intrusion of the courts into the proper affairs of the
co-equal branches of government."8 In the Taiwan treaty case,
Judge Wright, speaking for himself and Judge Tamm as the two
members of the court of appeals en banc who concluded that the
congressional plaintiffs lacked standing, commented that the issue
was "rooted in the dynamic relationship between the two political
branches" and that hearing the suit would invite "additional un-
necessary, and potentially dangerous, judicial incursions into the
area."Y
The courts have responded to these concerns by pressing a vari-
ety of doctrines into service to restrict the access of congressional
plaintiffs to the courts. The district courts and courts of appeals
have relied chiefly upon the standing doctrine to dismiss suits
where the congressional plaintiffs could not show concrete injury to
their legally protected interests.10 Last year, however, the Supreme
7 Treaty Termination; Hearings on S. Res. 15 Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 360 (1979).
S Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 716 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Wright, C. J., concurring),
judgment vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
10 See, e.g., Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978)
(congressman lacked standing to complain about appointment of members of Federal Re-
serve Open Market Committee because his power was not diminished thereby); Metcalf v.
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Court relied upon the ripeness and political question doctrines,
rather than standing, in simultaneously granting certiorari and di-
recting the dismissal of the complaint in the Taiwan treaty case.11
None of these traditional forms of judicial restraint adequately
addresses the special problems posed when congressmen sue the
executive branch. The standing, political question, and ripeness
doctrines are notoriously difficult to understand and to apply, and
they fall in varying degrees to account for the underlying separa-
tion-of-powers concerns. After discussing these problems, this Arti-
cle suggests that a better approach is available through the use of
the courts' traditional discretion to grant or withhold equitable re-
lief. The Article then turns to two cases to demonstrate that appli-
cation of this equitable discretion to congressional-plaintiff actions
is compatible both with our constitutional scheme and with the le-
gitimate rights of legislators.
I.
The first case to have any substantial effect on later develop-
ments1" was Kennedy v. Sampson,3 decided by the court of ap-
National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (senator lacked standing to chal-
lenge composition of federal advisory committee without specific allegation of injury); Har-
rington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975) (congressman lacked standing to enjoin
executive from allegedly spending money in violation of legislative restriction); Harrington
v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Riegle v. Federal Open Market Comm., 84 F.R.D. 114
(D.D.C. 1979); Metzenbaum v. Brown, 448 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1978); Public Citizen v.
Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974).
In Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976), afl'd mem. sub nom. Pressler v.
Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978), the district court held that a congressman claiming the
right to vote on congressional salary increases had standing to challenge legislation provid-
ing for automatic pay raises subject to veto by either house.
11 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
11 Kennedy was not the first case brought by legislators against executive branch officials.
The continuing military involvement of the United States in Indochina sparked two such
cases in the early 1970's. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974), was a suit to enjoin the bombing of Cambodia on the ground that
congressional action cutting off funds divested the executive branch of any power to con-
tinue the war in Cambodia. The court held that the claim was a nonjusticiable political
question. Id. at 1310. Almost as an afterthought, and without extended discussion, the court
held in the alternative that Representative Holtzman lacked standing. Id. at 1315.
Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973), was a suit by thirteen congressmen
against the Secretary of Defense seeking a declaration that further prosecution of any com-
bat activities in Indochina was an unconstitutional exercise of executive power. The court
held that plaintiffs had tendered a nonjusticiable political question, but not on the usual
ground that Congress had, by appropriating defense funds or authorizing a draft, acquiesced
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peals in 1974. Senator Kennedy sued two executive-branch officials
to compel publication of an act of Congress as law, contending that
the President had failed to achieve a valid pocket veto by relying
upon Congress's Christmas recess as the period within which the
bill would expire if not signed.1 Senator Kennedy alleged that he
had suffered injury in fact to his interests as a legislator sufficient
to establish his standing because the pocket veto had nullified his
vote in favor of the bill. The Government responded that only a
majority of a house of Congress had standing to challenge the nul-
lification of its vote by the executive.1 5 The court rejected that ar-
gument, noting that present standing rules allowed one member of
a group that had suffered a common injury to sue, even if other
members of the group chose not to do so.
The Kennedy court did not pay special attention to the separa-
tion-of-powers concerns inherent in any effort by a single congress-
man to transform legislation into law by judicial fiat. However, be-
cause Kennedy did reflect current thinking about standing, it was
principally relied upon by later courts in evaluating the injuries
sustained by congressional plaintiffs." To be sure, many of these
litigants were turned away from the courts because the alleged in-
juries to their "effectiveness" as legislators were not thought to rise
in the President's handling of the war. Instead, the court, leaving aside the issue of whether
former President Johnson had the power to engage in hostilities, declared that then-Presi-
dent Nixon had the power as Commander-in-Chief to wind up this country's military in-
volvement with Indochina in an orderly fashion. Whether President Nixon was really termi-
nating America's war effort in southeast Asia was, to the court, another political question
that judges could not decide. Id. at 615-16.
Mitchell v. Laird, unlike Holtzman v. Schlesinger, declared that the plaintiff-legislators
had standing to maintain their action against the executive branch. The Mitchell court rea-
soned that a judicial declaration on the legality of the Vietnam War would "bear upon"
these plaintiffs' actions as legislators by providing them with useful information. Id. at 614.
However, Mitchell was ignored in Kennedy v. Sampson and its authority explicitly under-
mined by Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Harrington court
pointed out that the "bears upon" test actually legitimizes advisory opinions, because plain-
tiffs are seeking any judicial statement regardless of its content. If the plaintiffs' injury
would be redressed as well by a loss as by a victory on the merits, then they are suffering no
injury in fact at all.
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1 Id. at 432.
"Id. at 435.
" See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), judgment vacated,
444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v.
National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528
F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Metzenbaum v. Brown, 448 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1978).
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to the level of the injury sustained in Kennedy.17
Although post-Kennedy cases generally had held legislators to
lack standing, no court has raised significant questions about the
viability of Kennedy itself. Thus, when Goldwater v. Carter, a case
brought by a small group of Senators and Representatives alleging
that President Carter could not terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty with Taiwan without either a two-thirds vote of the Senate
or a majority of both houses of Congress,18 was appealed, the court
of appeals turned to Kennedy and the cases following it. 19
The issue of standing had figured heavily in the Goldwater case
even before it had reached the court of appeals. The district court
had dismissed without prejudice the first suit brought by Senator
Goldwater and his colleagues pending the outcome of a vote on a
resolution asserting, as a general principle, the Senate's right to
vote on treaty terminations.2 0 After the Senate had taken a prelim-
inary favorable vote on the resolution, the plaintiffs returned to
the district court, which now held that they had standing to chal-
lenge presidential termination of the Taiwan treaty. From the dis-
trict court's determination on the merits that the treaty could only
be terminated with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
'7 See, e.g., Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978);
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council,
553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975).
18 See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.)
(en banc), judgment vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
19 See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 701-03 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), judgment vacated,
444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
20 Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979).
11 I should perhaps make clear precisely what the proceedings were in the Senate with
respect to the Taiwan matter. After President Carter had given his one-year notice of termi-
nation, Senator Harry Byrd introduced his resolution stating the sense of the Senate to be
that Senate approval was required to terminate any mutual-defense treaty. This was re-
ferred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which, after hearings, voted to replace it
with a resolution detailing a number of bases upon which the President could act to termi-
nate a treaty. The Senate voted, however, 59 to 37, to substitute the Byrd resolution for the
Committee's proposal.
Before the hearing of the appeal in the court of appeals, the majority leader said that he
had been conferring with Senator Goldwater and had reason to believe that an agreement
could be reached. The hopes then aroused on the court's part of not having to decide the
appeal vanished when, after the oral arguments, the Byrd resolution was called up for con-
sideration and then cast back into limbo when the majority leader and Senator Goldwater
disagreed as to whether approval of the President's action would require a two-thirds vote
or a mere majority. It seems obvious that both the majority leader and Senator Goldwater
had counted the heads very carefully.
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Senate or a majority of each house of Congress, President Carter
appealed.22
After hearing the case en banc, the court of appeals issued a per
curiam opinion holding that (1) the Senators had standing to sue,
but (2) the President could terminate the Taiwan treaty without
the advice and consent of the Senate.2s The court noted that it had
taken pains to distinguish two different kinds of claims, only one
of which could support a finding of injury in fact. A legislator's
claim that his effectiveness had been diminished because the exec-
utive had failed to administer a statute properly or had not pro-
vided the legislator with complete or accurate information had
been unanimously rejected as a basis for standing after Kennedy.
On the other hand, interference with a legislator's right to vote
that amounted to a "disenfranchisement, a complete nullification
or withdrawal of a voting opportunity" as measured by an objec-
tive textual standard was considered to be a cognizable injury in
fact.24
The difficulty in Goldwater was finding something akin to a dis-
enfranchisement, a difficulty compounded by the circumstances
that the Senate had not taken final action on any of the general
resolutions, and that at no time did even thirty-four Senators ex-
pressly assert that they would vote against the termination of the
Taiwan treaty. The court resolved the problem by noting that
thirty-four Senators could never force an unwilling Senate to take
a vote on any declaration of their right to block rescission of the
Taiwan treaty and therefore no legislative remedy existed to which
plaintiffs could be directed. Further, there was no way of ensuring
that the President would heed any Senate action on the Taiwan
treaty, since his opposition to giving the Senate any voice in treaty
termination had been made clear beyond cavil. The court therefore
held that President Carter's refusal to submit the Taiwan treaty
22 See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), judgment vacated,
444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
22 Id. at 703. The reasoning employed on the merits was equally applicable to the claims
of plaintiff-Representatives, see id. at 703-09; the discussion of standing, however, focused
largely on the plaintiff-Senators, see id. at 702-03. Judge MacKinnon, dissenting in part,
concluded that treaties could be terminated by majority vote of both houses of Congress, see
id. at 739 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part).
34 Id. at 702. See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. National Petroleum
Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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for Senate action deprived the plaintiffs "of an opportunity to cast
a binding vote" because "they ha[d] no legislative power to exer-
cise an equivalent voting opportunity."2 5
Chief Judge Wright, in a separate opinion, 2  read our Kennedy
opinion more narrowly, drawing a distinction between nullification
of votes already taken and denial of opportunities to vote.27 He
asserted that no legislator could suffer injury in fact until Congress
had suffered injury in fact, and that this could not happen until
"the Executive has thwarted its will."-" He drew the conclusion
that there was no legislative will to thwart until "Congress has spo-
ken unequivocally. 2 9 The injury suffered by Senator Kennedy was
different because it was "wholly dependent on the harm to the
past vote."80
In a memorandum opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the court
of appeals' judgment that the Senate had no right to vote on ter-
mination of this treaty on the grounds that, for one reason or an-
other, the plaintiffs did not pose a question susceptible to judicial
resolution. The justices did not conclude that the plaintiffs lacked
standing. Rather, in separate opinions by Justices Powell and
Rehnquist, they relied upon the doctrines of ripeness and political
question, respectively. 1
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Stewart and Stevens as
well as the Chief Justice, held that the plaintiffs had presented a
25 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 703 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), judgment vacated, 444
U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
26 Judge Wright's opinion was styled a concurrence, because it was a decision in favor of
President Carter on the standing issue. The majority opinion had found for the President on
the merits, determining that he need not have submitted the termination of the Taiwan
treaty to the Senate. Judge Wright, however, disagreed with the majority on the standing
issue.
27 617 F.2d at 712 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
2 Id.
29 Id. (citation omitted).
30 Id. at 712 n.5.
31 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). Six justices concurred in summarily
vacating the court of appeals' judgment. Justice Marshall, although concurring in the result,
did not join either opinion. Justices Blackmun and White dissented in part, stating their
desire to set the case down for oral argument. Id. at 1006 (White & Blackmun, JJ., dissent-
ing). Justice Brennan dissented, arguing for affirmance of the court of appeals opinion on
the grounds that the President alone has the power to grant or withdraw recognition of a
foreign government and that abrogation of the treaty was a necessary consequence of the




nonjusticiable political question based upon the traditional tests
articulated in Baker v. Carr.2 He noted that the Constitution was
silent on the issue of treaty termination, leaving judges with no
judicially manageable standards for resolution of the issue. He also
relied upon the nature of the case as bearing upon the foreign rela-
tions of the United States to make his conclusion more
"4compelling.'133
Justice Powell, unable to accept the application of the political
question doctrine to treaty disputes in general, relied upon the
doctrine of ripeness. He argued that the reasoning underlying Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion was too broad: it would render nonjusti-
ciable a challenge to presidential implementation of a treaty that
the Senate had voted to reject because the Constitution does not
state in so many words the legal effect of a treaty signed by the
President but rejected by the Senate.'" Moreover, Justice Powell
did not understand how this case fitted into the traditional catego-
ries of nonjusticiable political questions. He noted that there was
neither a textual commitment of the question to a coordinate
branch of government nor prudential considerations against inter-
vention in a properly-presented treaty termination case. Disagree-
ing with Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell stated that there was no
lack of judicially ascertainable standards to resolve the question.
"Resolution of the question may not be easy," he said, "but it only
requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation to the con-
stitutional provisions at issue."35 Justice Powell concluded, instead,
that the instant dispute was not ripe for adjudication because the
Senate had never taken any final action on the resolution asserting
its right to vote on treaty terminations. Thus, the Court could "not
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962):
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a politi-
cal decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.





know whether there ever will be an actual confrontation between
the Legislative and Executive branches."36
In the aftermath of Goldwater, the present learning on congres-
sional suits against the executive appears unsettled at best. With
respect to standing, the court of appeals was unable to agree upon
the precise scope of Kennedy. The Supreme Court does not appear
inclined to employ standing at all, but could not muster a majority
for either political question or ripeness. The fault may lie not with
the courts, but with the formulae that have been thought relevant
to suits by congressional plaintiffs against the executive. A closer
examination of the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and political
question as they relate to these lawsuits seems, therefore, to be in
order.
II.
When a congressional plaintiff asks for a declaratory or injunc-
tive remedy against the executive branch, the court's decision must
be grounded in an understanding of the proper function of the ju-
dicial branch in our constitutional scheme. In some cases, a court
could award an equitable remedy without danger of infringing the
principle of separation of powers. In other cases, however, equita-
ble relief may result in impermissible judicial intrusion into the
functions of a coordinate branch of government. The principles of
law applied by a court in determining whether to hear a particular
case should be capable of distinguishing between these situations.
A court's reluctance to hear a congressional plaintiff's claim on
the merits is most pronounced when the dispute appears to be not
with the executive branch so much as with fellow legislators. In
holding that the plaintiff lacked standing as a legislator to chal-
lenge the membership of the Federal Reserve Open Market Com-
mittee when his proposed bill to change the membership had failed
of passage, the court of appeals commented that "[t]his circum-
stance, while certainly not fatal to his standing claim, does illus-
trate that his actual controversy lies, or may lie, with his fellow
legislators. . .. ,,s7 In Harrington v. Bush, the court noted that the
plaintiff's complaint that CIA appropriations were hidden in other
budget accounts was
36 Id. at 998.
37Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
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imposed by the House of Representatives through its own
rules; yet appellant had sued, not the House, but.., the Ex-
ecutive Branch .... What appellant would have us do here is
to intervene on behalf of one member of the Legislative
Branch to change 'the rules of its proceedings' adopted by the
entire body of the House. This we should not do.38
In these circumstances, the separation-of-powers concerns are
most acute. The court said in Harrington v. Bush that "[imn defer-
ence to the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of
powers, the judiciary must take special care to avoid intruding into
a constitutionally delineated prerogative of the Legislative
Branch."'s3 The cases in which a plaintiff has tried and failed to
gain relief from his colleagues, or not tried at all, present judges
not with a chance to mediate between the two political branches
but with the possibility of thwarting Congress's will by allowing a
plaintiff to circumvent the processes of democratic decisionmaking.
Usually, the named defendant is an executive branch official, leav-
ing the real disputants behind on Capitol Hill when the plaintiff
removes the dispute to a federal courthouse. This meddling with
the internal decisionmaking processes of one of the political
branches extends judicial power beyond the limits inherent in the
constitutional scheme for dividing federal power.
On the other hand, the judiciary cannot refuse to entertain dis-
putes merely because they do not admit of simple resolution or
implicate key constitutional concerns. Judges should not refuse to
hear the claim of any litigant, even a legislator whose dispute is
with his colleagues, without consistent application of a principled
rationale. If, under the general rules regulating the adjudication of
cases and controversies, a congressional litigant has standing and
tenders a justiciable claim, then the courts cannot simply refuse in
their discretion to decide the merits unless they provide sound rea-
sons of general applicability for their decision. Professor Herbert
Wechsler has said that "[tihe courts have both the title and the
duty when a case is properly before them to review the actions of
the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions.' ' °
u 553 F.2d 190, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Id. (footnote omitted).




Chief Justice Marshall warned, in Cohens v. Virginia:41
[TIhis court . . .must take jurisdiction, if it should. The
judiciary cannot ... avoid a measure, because it approaches
the confines of the constitution .... We have no more right
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution.
The duty to decide justiciable cases, according to Professor
Wechsler, is embedded in the doctrine of judicial review itself, as
enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. Pro-
fessor Wechsler argues that if, as Marbury maintains, "[ilt is...
the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the
law is,' 42 then "there is no [discretionary] escape from the judicial
obligation.' 43 In an analogous vein, Professor Gerald Gunther la-
ments those who would transform a narrow ability to decline adju-
dicating certain cases into a "virtually unlimited choice in deciding
whether to decide."' 4 Reliance on unprincipled grounds to avoid
adjudication, Professor Gunther warns, can "frequently inflict
damage upon legitimate areas of principle."' 5 He notes a final
irony: unprincipled refusals to adjudicate justiciable cases where
"there is an obligation to decide" are really "a virulent variety of
free-wheeling interventionism. ' '46
Therefore, it is important to arrive at a principled basis for de-
nying some congressional plaintiffs a judicial forum, lest the desire
to avoid undue intervention in the affairs of the political branches
find expression in unreasoned - and unreasonable - refusals to
adjudicate.
III.
In thinking about the use of the standing doctrine in these con-
41 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
4' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
"I Wechsler, supra note 41, at 6.
" Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues": A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 17 (1964). Although Professor Gun-
ther was speaking of the Supreme Court's discretion to forbear deciding cases, his comments
are, if anything, more applicable to the other article III courts, which lack the discretionary
control over their dockets granted to the Supreme Court by its certiorari jurisdiction.
45 Id. at 22.
46 Id. at 25.
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gressional-plaintiff cases, one is struck by the coincidence of the
rise of the congressional suit against the executive with a series of
remarkable fluctuations in the rigor of the standing doctrine.
When Kennedy was handed down in 1974, the panel relied upon
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp,47 a then-recent Supreme Court case greatly liberalizing the
law of standing. The Camp Court established a two-part test for
standing: injury (1) in fact, and (2) to an interest that the relevant
law arguably seeks to protect.45 The Kennedy court's inquiry into
standing was structured along those lines, and found that nullifica-
tion of an individual legislator's vote was an injury against which
the Constitution arguably provides protection.
Camp, however, has been far from the last word from the Su-
preme Court on standing. Warth v. Seldin added a third require-
ment: plaintiffs must establish that "prospective relief will remove
the harm" caused by defendants.4 In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization, decided the next year, the Supreme
Court further tightened standing requirements by imposing upon
plaintiffs the duty to show that their injury was fairly traceable to
the actions of the defendants.8 0 It was perhaps the restrictive tenor
of these cases that led courts to scrutinize the claims of congres-
sional litigants with particular care during this time. 1
Recent years, however, have seen a relaxation of the standing
rules. In Duke Power Co. v. North Carolina Environmental Group,
Inc.,2 the Court added to the requirement of injury in fact only
the burden of establishing that the injury would never come to
pass but for the defendant's conduct. Although the Duke Power
decision professed fealty to the more restrictive lines of cases ex-
emplified by Warth and Simon, the long chain of factual assump-
tions that it embodied has led Professor Davis to anoint it as one
of the two most "liberal" standing decisions ever handed down by
47 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
48 Id. at 152-53. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511
F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
4' Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975).
60 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 205 n.68 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
&I See, e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 205-06 & n.68 ("The precedential value of
[Mitchell and Kennedy] for appellant lies in the degree to which the reasoning employed
continues to be consistent with the broader framework established by the Supreme Court.").




My purpose in briefly reviewing the general law of standing is
not to criticize its development or present state, but merely to in-
dicate that lower court judges have at least been dealing with a
moving target. Whatever problems exist in applying the concept of
standing to congressional litigants - and I believe that there are
serious ones - are compounded by the continuing fluidity of the
standing doctrine itself. It can hardly be surprising, therefore, that
judges have not completely resolved the issue of congressional ac-
cess to courts in the six years that saw dramatic changes in the
doctrine most commonly applied to reject these suits.
The troubles with the use of standing in this context run deeper,
however, than any lack of constancy in the concept itself. Its appli-
cation to congressional plaintiffs leads judges, who start with the
two firm principles running through virtually all of these cases,
into a contradiction. The first principle is that the requirements of
standing apply with equal rigor to congressional and private plain-
tiffs. The court in Harrington v. Bush said: "[T]here are no special
standards for determining Congressional standing questions.""
The second requirement is that the plaintiff suffer an injury that
his colleagues cannot redress. Thus, when congressional plaintiffs
have sought to accomplish through the courts what they were una-
ble to persuade their colleagues to do, they usually have been re-
mitted to their legislative remedies.
There can be no peaceful coexistence between, on the one hand,
the notion that legislators are treated like any other plaintiff for
standing purposes, and, on the other, the idea that courts should
rigorously scrutinize whether the congressional plaintiff's true
quarrel is with his colleagues, rather than the executive. There is
no general requirement that a private litigant employ self-help
before seeking judicial relief.'5 Nor should there be, because an or-
dinary plaintiff, having suffered injury in fact within the contem-
plation of the law he invokes, is entitled to his day in court. If the
plaintiff passes the standing test and presents a justiciable dispute,
53 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATrV LAW TREATISE §§ 22.02-12 (1978 Supp.). Further evidence of
this recent thaw can be found in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979).
553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis omitted).
B' Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1632, 1642 (1977).
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it is assumed that the political branches have decided to commit
such disputes to the judiciary and, barring extraordinary circum-
stances, that is a judgment which courts are bound to respect."
The underlying difficulty is that the reasons for restricting suits
by legislators against the executive have little to do with the stand-
ing doctrine. Standing, although reflecting a desire for judicial re-
straint,57 does not address the separation-of-powers concerns in-
herent in any suit by a legislator against the executive branch. Nor
should this be surprising, for standing has always been thought of
as turning upon the relationship of plaintiff to claim,58 not upon
the relationship of plaintiff to defendant that is so troublesome
here. The issue is not the relationship of defendant's conduct to
plaintiff's injury, as in Warth or Simon. Instead, the issue is plain-
tiff's status as a member, but not an authorized representative, of a
political branch seeking to impose his will upon the other political
branch.
The inability of the standing doctrine to reflect separation-of-
powers concerns is reflected by the inability of its central notion,
injury in fact, to encompass our special rules of legislator standing.
Consider the requirement that the legislator lack collegial reme-
dies. Senator Goldwater was no less injured by President Carter's
refusal to submit the Taiwan treaty for termination before the
" In attempting to reconcile these competing principles, judges also run the risk that,
particularly in light of the current uncertainty of the standing doctrine, rules of standing
adopted to control congressional access to courts will later be applied to deprive private
litigants of their day in court.
" The standing doctrine is based, in part, on article III's commitment to the judiciary of
only "Cases" and "Controversies." See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). However, beyond this article
III core lies a range in which courts, for prudential reasons "closely related to Art. III con-
cerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance," may dismiss the claim even
though plaintiff presents a constitutionally sufficient injury. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
500 (1976). Thus, standing "involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court juris-
diction and prudential limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions it is founded in con-
cern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Id. at 498 (citations omitted).
" See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) ("Such inquiries into the nexus between the
status asserted by the litigant and the claim he presents are essential to assure that he is a
proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power."); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 156 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER] ("the question of standing. . . is
* * . whether the litigant has a sufficient personal interest in getting the relief he seeks, or is
a sufficiently appropriate representative of other interested persons. ").
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Senate's preliminary vote on its resolution than afterwards. In ad-
dition, the general understanding of injury in fact does not admit
of our distinction between objective injuries sufficient for standing
and purely subjective injuries that are not. In circumstances other
than congressional suits against the executive, a subjective injury is
often considered to be injury in fact. Certainly, the plaintiffs in
SCRAP, who had standing based upon their lessened enjoyment of
Washington-area parks caused by alleged disincentives to re-
cycling,59 suffered injuries no less subjective than did Representa-
tive Harrington, who claimed that lack of information about illegal
CIA activities hampered his effort to oversee and monitor that
agencyso
The use of the standing doctrine to address the separation-of-
powers concerns arising when federal legislators sue the executive
branch in federal court is fraught with difficulties both in theory
and in application. Although it has been the most popular method
of judicial self-restraint in these cases, the recent Supreme Court
decision in Goldwater, which made no use of the term, suggests
that its day may have passed insofar as these lawsuits are con-
cerned. It remains to be seen whether the doctrines that the Court
has used in its stead are either more elegant in their conception or
more satisfying in their execution.
IV.
Justice Rehnquist came within one vote of rallying a majority of
the Court around the proposition that the challengers of the Tai-
wan treaty termination had tendered a nonjusticiable political
question. That relatively warm embrace of the political question
doctrine, however, does not establish its worth nor ensure its tri-
umph. Aside from the Taiwan treaty case, the recent history of the
doctrine has been one of judicial indifference and scathing schol-
arly attack. The result has been to expose shortcomings in the doc-
trine that render it unsuitable for service in the analysis of con-
gressional-plaintiff cases.
The last Supreme Court case to rely in any way upon the politi-
51 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973).
1* Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 200-03 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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cal question doctrine was the 1973 case of Gilligan v. Morgan,", in
which the Court dissolved a mandatory injunction to reform the
Ohio National Guard because of perceived deficiencies in the
case. 2 These deficiencies included the "advisory nature" of the de-
cree, the possibility that no controversy existed, standing
problems, the difficulties of supervising the remedy, and the nature
of the issue presented as "subjects committed expressly to the po-
litical branches of government."63 It was the last ground that
sounded very much like application of the political-question doc-
trine. The most recent case to rely squarely on the doctrine was
Colegrove v. Green,"4 a 1946 reapportionment case whose vitality
was wholly sapped sixteen years later by Baker v. Carr.
Even more remarkable has been the withering academic attack
on the political question doctrine. Professor Louis Henkin suc-
ceeded in analyzing the doctrine essentially out of existence. He
argued persuasively that so-called "political question" cases were
almost always decisions on the merits rather than determinations
that the merits were nonjusticiable. 5 In most cases, in short, the
Court "does not refuse judicial review; it exercises it."' 6 The fac-
tors articulated in Baker v. Carr merely indicate the situations in
which deference to the political branches on the merits is most
advisable.6 7
The only true political question cases, according to Professor
Henkin, are those involving the constitutional guarantee of a re-
publican form of government.6 8 His colleague Professor Wechsler,
while not taking quite as strict a view, nevertheless believed that
the doctrine, when properly conceived of as a judicial refusal to
decide the merits, was limited to situations where "the Constitu-
tion has committed the determination of the issue to another
413 U.S. 1 (1973).
"Id. at 10.
, Id. Professor Louis Henkin found the Court's reasons for denying relief to be "not
clear." Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 621 (1976).
- 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"5 According to Professor Henkin, even the dissenters in Baker v. Carr agreed that malap-
portionment was justiciable, although they believed it to be constitutional. Henkin, supra
note 63, at 607, 616-17.
Id. at 606.
"Id. at 605-06 & nn.26-27.
Id. at 608-09, 622-23.
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agency of government than the courts." 9 This grudging scholarly
and judicial treatment of the doctrine is presumably attributable
at least in part to a recognition of its inherent defects. In Professor
Henkin's view, the doctrine is "an unnecessary, deceptive packag-
ing of several established doctrines that has misled lawyers and
courts to find in it things that were never put there and make it far
more than the sum of its parts., 70
Assuming that such an ambivalent doctrine may have some util-
ity in deciding whether legislators may sue the executive, the
proper inquiry is to determine whether the Constitution commits
the matter at issue to some other body. Nothing in articles II or III
suggests that, assuming the court has jurisdiction, anyone but the
judicial branch should decide this question. In Goldwater, Justice
Rehnquist limited his discussion to the merits of the case - not
the characteristics of the plaintiffs - in concluding that the issue
of treaty termination has been committed by the Constitution to
the political branches.7 1 He admitted, however, that the Constitu-
tion speaks not at all of treaty termination, leaving the clarity of
the textual commitment of the issue in some doubt. In any case, he
did not assert the applicability of the doctrine to congressional
suits generally.
Justice Rehnquist also employed another strand of the political
question doctrine in support of his argument: the notion that a
case lacking "judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for" its resolution presents a nonjusticiable political question." If
the Constitution is silent on the question, he argued, then it is im-
possible for courts to ascertain those judicially manageable stan-
dards." Professor Henkin believes that this consideration goes not
to abstaining from judicial review, but to deferring on the merits
to the determinations of the political branches, absent a clear con-
stitutional trespass.74 Its applicability to our problem is thus
debatable.
The question of treaty termination is one that, while difficult,
hardly admits of no solution. The court of appeals found other
Wechsler, supra note 40, at 9.
70 Henkin, supra note 63, at 622.
71 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-05 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
71 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 162, 217 (1962).
1 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
7, Henkin, supra note 63, at 605-06. See note 32 supra.
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constitutional materials, international law, and past cases sug-
gesting that the Senate had no role in the termination of a treaty,
at least in the situation where the treaty consented to by the Sen-
ate has a provision for unilateral termination by either party. The
court was at some pains to make clear that it decided nothing with
respect to the Senate's power to condition its consent upon resub-
mission to it of any presidential action to terminate. Justice Pow-
ell, explaining why he could not dispose of this case under the po-
litical question rubric, remarked that its resolution "may not be
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of interpre-
tation to the constitutional provisions at issue."75
Justice Powell also noted that use of the political question doc-
trine in the Goldwater case might lead to unsound results in cases
in which judicial intervention would be more appropriate. His ex-
ample was a lawsuit by senators seeking to enjoin the President
from putting into effect a treaty that had been rejected by the Sen-
ate. While Justice Rehnquist might conceivably be able to discern
judicially manageable standards to resolve that dispute, other ex-
amples limited to the field of treaty termination would surely pre-
sent Justice Rehnquist and those who joined him with a nonjusti-
ciable political question. Assume that Senator Goldwater had
rallied all of his colleagues to the position that (1) the Senate had a
right to vote on treaty terminations, and (2) the Taiwan treaty spe-
cifically should remain in effect. Even if all 100 senators had voted
to continue that treaty in force, use of the political question doc-
trine as articulated by Justice Rehnquist would close off all ave-
nues of judicial relief to those senators.
The political question doctrine is even less capable of resolving
other types of congressional-plaintiff problems. It turns upon an
examination of plaintiff's claim, not his identity or status. When
Indian tribes questioned an attempted pocket veto by President
Coolidge, the Supreme Court went to the merits without even
mentioning the political question doctrine.76 It would be hard to
explain why, when Senator Kennedy presents a similar claim, his
status as legislator transforms the cause of action into a nonjusti-
ciable political question. The political question doctrine, although
concerned with the separation of powers, is arguably an inappro-
76 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
74 Okanogon Indian Tribe v. United States (The Pocket Veto Case), 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
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priate method of resolving the problems presented by congres-
sional suits against the executive branch.
V.
Justice Powell's vote to dismiss the complaint in the Taiwan
treaty case was based upon the ripeness doctrine. He said that the
Senate's failure to pass a final resolution asserting its right to vote
on treaty terminations left the Court unable to ascertain whether
there was an actual confrontation between the executive and legis-
lative branches. Thus, Justice Powell's use of ripeness did impli-
cate the principle that the judiciary should stay its hand unless
persuaded that a legislator's dispute is with the defendant and not
with his colleagues.
While Justice Powell was warranted in stressing the nature of
the dispute in an effort to avoid unnecessary judicial involvement
with Congress, the ripeness doctrine may not be the best way of
translating these separation of powers concerns into rules of deci-
sion. Problems of ripeness usually exist when events that have not
yet occurred are likely to have a significant effect on the litigation.
Professor Gunther has identified some of these uncertainties:
The relationship between the parties is . . . still in flux and
developing. . . The plaintiff may not yet be able to say spe-
cifically what action he expects to take. Similarly, it may not
yet be possible to say what specific actions the defendant will
take against the plaintiff. The record in such a case will typi-
cally consist in part of predictions about the probable conduct
of both parties; the parties' behavior turns on contingencies
and requires guesses about the future."
Two sorts of problems are raised. First, the dispute may be so
unformed or hypothetical as to fall outside the article III grant of
jurisdiction over cases and controversies. Thus a federal court may
be without adjudicatory authority in very extreme cases, such as
those calling for an advisory opinion.7 8 Second, a court may have
power to adjudicate a marginally ripe dispute under article III, but
choose not to. The court may wish to avoid a decision based on
77 G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1656 (10th ed. 1980).
76 See, e.g., Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928); Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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hypotheses that may never come to pass because the facts, once
the dispute ripens, may suggest another outcome, or because the
court believes, for many reasons based upon its desire for restraint,
that it should restrict itself to cases presenting a clear and pointed
dispute.
For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that judicial re-
view of agency regulations before they are applied in specific situa-
tions can represent an undesirable intrusion upon the regulatory
scheme instituted by the political branches, and has dismissed pe-
titions for their review as unripe.79 Thus the ripeness doctrine, as
serving judicial restraint, is not wholly incompatible with efforts to
avoid intrusion in the affairs of the other two branches. Indeed, its
use in Goldwater seemed appropriate, but its value in other con-
texts is more dubious.
It is hard to see how the ripeness doctrine could have been in-
voked to decide the Kennedy case, or any case where the claim
depends upon alleged nullification of past votes. Senator Kennedy
presented the court with a dispute turning on facts that had al-
ready occurred: the Congress had passed a bill, the President had
not signed it, the defendants had not published it as law. While
the court decided that case, it would be distinctly less eager to ad-
judicate a legislator's claim that the executive had failed to enforce
a law for which plaintiff had voted and thus had nullified his vote.
But the facts supporting his claim would be no less ripe. Similarly,
a legislator could allege that the executive had denied him infor-
mation he needed to draft legislation or to oversee a government
agency, and that dispute could be perfectly ripe, although wholly
inappropriate for judicial intervention.
The problem, of course, is that the ripeness doctrine has no spe-
cial sensitivity or relationship to the particular separation-of-pow-
ers concerns confronting the courts in this context. As such, its
utility in the Goldwater case was essentially fortuitous and its
value for future litigation is speculative.
VI.
Having toppled so many trees in the forest of judicial restraint,
79 Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967). See also Gardner v. Toilet Goods
Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 174-201 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). But see Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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it may seem as if I have left judges with no place to hide when
congressional plaintiffs come in search of a remedy operative
against the executive branch. That is not the case. Although the
existing methods that courts have used to forbear deciding these
cases have proven unsatisfactory in varying degree, the judges who
employed them were surely motivated by a proper respect for the
political branches and a disinclination to intervene unnecessarily
in their disputes. It may plausibly be asserted, therefore, that the
best way to translate those concerns into principled decisionmak-
ing is through the discretion of the federal court to grant or to
withhold injunctive or declaratory relief.8 0
The federal courts have always embraced the notion that plain-
tiff's tender of a meritorious claim does not necessarily entitle him
to equitable relief. In recent years, the Supreme Court has em-
ployed the doctrine of equitable discretion to turn away many
plaintiffs seeking injunctions against pending or imminent state
criminal proceedings. The leading case in this area, Younger v.
Harris, explicitly "rests on the absence of the factors necessary
under equitable principles to justify federal intervention. . .. "81
There have been suggestions that the Court's equitable discre-
tion should be exercised not only upon considerations of federal-
ism, as in the Younger line of cases, but in aid of the separation of
powers as well. Concurring in Colegrove v. Green, where the Court
held that reapportionment presented a nonjusticiable political
question, Justice Rutledge insisted that the suit was more properly
dismissed for want of equity, because an equitable remedy "may
bring our function into clash with the political depart-
ments .. "82
Thirty years later, Professor Henkin turned to Justice Rut-
ledge's notion of want of equity in his search for a suitable substi-
tute for the political question doctrine. As I have already noted,
Professor Henkin believed that the great majority of "political
question" cases were actually determinations on the merits rather
than dismissals for lack of justiciability. Since dismissal for want of
5o This path was suggested in Note, supra note 55, at 1652-54, as a method of dealing
with statutory claims. The Note suggested use of the political question doctrine to handle
suits by congressmen alleging unconstitutional executive action. See id. at 1648-52.
81 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
s2 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1946).
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equity is similarly not a determination of nonjusticiability, Profes-
sor Henkin concluded that use of equitable discretion would cut
through the confusion that had overgrown the political question
doctrine. He saw nothing anomalous in considering separation-of-
powers questions to determine the propriety of equitable relief,
given the public-interest considerations relied upon by judges to
guide the exercise of their equity powers."'
Judges may employ an analogous discretion in refusing to grant
plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment. Innumerable cases
have held that the granting of declaratory relief is discretionary
with the court, to be exercised on the basis of reasoned judgment
and sound principles." The separation-of-powers concerns that
these congressional-plaintiff cases present are as worthy of respect
as the federalism questions so often relied upon by federal courts
in refusing to grant a declaratory judgment against state officials. 8
Judges must, of course, have a principled standard for the exer-
cise of their equitable discretion that will allow them to avoid in-
tervening when the dispute is best left to the Congress, but to open
the doors of the court when their failure to do so would place the
constitutional system in greater peril. Their fear is that legislators
will turn to the courts when the plaintiff's dispute is really with his
fellow legislators. The disappointed legislator then asks the court
to order the executive to do what Congress itself may not wish to
be done. To avoid interfering with the work of the Congress, a
court should use its equitable discretion to deny a remedy to any
legislator who could get substantial relief from his fellow
legislators.
This is not the same as an exhaustion requirement, because it
does not merely postpone judicial relief. A legislator who unsuc-
cessfully attempts to enlist Congress's aid will normally be unable
to enlist the court's. In fact, it is far more likely under this stan-
dard that he will get an equitable or declaratory remedy when
Congress, in agreement with him, takes action that is frustrated by
the executive branch.
The argument is made that, even if Congress agrees with the leg-
: Henkin, supra note 63, at 618-25 & nn.61-62.
84 See 6A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.08(2) (1979).
$a See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). See also 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 1 57.08(6.-2), (7) (1979).
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islator, the judiciary should stay its hand because Congress always
has power to assert its will against the executive branch. This argu-
ment, if accepted, would almost always close the doors of the court
even when one entire house of Congress itself appears as plaintiff.
Other commentators have pointed out two significant problems
with the argument. First, denying judicial relief on discretionary
grounds would exalt the discretion of unelected judges over the de-
cision of a political branch that judicial relief is appropriate. Sec-
ond, remitting a particularized dispute to resolution through
whatever paralytic devices Congress can muster disserves the effi-
cient operation of our constitutional system.8 7
Congress may be able to triumph on the issue presented to the
court by refusing to vote appropriations, blocking presidential ap-
pointments, or engaging in other tactics that would frustrate the
functioning of the government. The alternative to such frustration
is for Congress to decide that its dispute is not worth the trouble it
would cause, leaving one branch of government without any rem-
edy at all. Surely the judiciary may have a legitimate role to play
in helping a coordinate branch out of such a dilemma when Con-
gress asserts that the executive has acted lawlessly. The congres-
sional-standing cases have always drawn a bright line between the
derivative suits, in which the legislator appears in court on behalf
of himself or a small group, and those in which the legislator
stands as the officially-authorized agent of a house of Congress. As
Judge Leventhal said, in holding that one congressman acting as
an agent for the House of Representatives could seek judicial assis-
tance in enforcing a subpoena, "the House as a whole has standing
to assert its investigatory power, and can designate a member to
act on its behalf."8 8
Conceivably Congress may be able to make its wishes known by
limiting a federal court's discretion to withhold declaratory relief.
As that discretion was bestowed by statute, Congress is arguably
free to remove it either generally or with respect to particular
cases.89 This ability to limit federal court discretion" can be re-
" Note, supra note 55, at 164748.
Id. at 1648.
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
n The decision by Congress to remove a federal court's discretion to award a declaratory
judgment should not raise any constitutional concerns, Even if Congress stipulates that the
courts lack discretion in one particular subject area, the c6urts are still free to reject the
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garded as consistent with the overall n-otion that the decision of
Congress to seek judicial review of executive action is, given the
tender of a constitutionally-adequate dispute, of critical impor-
tance to any determination of justiciability vel non. The congres-
sional decision to limit discretion is a determination that the fed-
eral courts should decide the case. In that regard, it appears to be
no different from any other congressional action on a particular
issue in aid of a legislator complaining of executive misconduct. In
both cases, the federal court will decide the case with the support
of at least one of the political branches.
Invoking the court's discretion to deny an equitable remedy
when the petitioner could get adequate relief from his fellow legis-
lators seems to be the most satisfying way of resolving these cases.
It avoids the difficulties and confusions engendered by the doc-
trines of standing, political question, and ripeness, and affords the
court wide latitude to choose the course that it believes to be most
in the public interest under the precise circumstances before it.
That choice obviously can comprehend adjudication on the merits
as well as the staying of the court's hand.
Under this standard, both the Goldwater and Kennedy cases
present extremely close questions. In the former, the senator-plain-
tiffs asserted that the President's notice of termination was subject
to the consent of the Senate by a two-thirds vote. The Senate had,
by a vote of fifty-nine to thirty-seven, amended a resolution to
substitute language stating the sense of the Senate to be that its
approval was required to terminate any mutual-defense treaty, but
the majority leader never permitted this resolution to come to a
final vote.' 1 There were no proceedings of any kind in the House of
Representatives related to the claim by the House plaintiffs that
claim on the merits. The freedom of the federal courts to reach a decision either way on the
merits avoids the constitutional infirmities discussed in United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128 (1872).
The power of Congress over a federal court's equitable discretion is a more murky
question. It can be argued that such discretion is part of the "judicial power" and therefore
can be exercised only by the tribunal from which an equitable remedy is sought. On the
other hand, if it is constitutional for Congress to withdraw a federal court's equitable pow-
ers, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 58, at 332-33, the relatively less-intrusive act of
requiring courts to grant an equitable remedy to a prevailing party might seem part of
Congress's power over the lower federal courts granted by article I, section 8 of the
Constitution.
,1 See note 21 supra.
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the termination required the approval of a majority of both houses.
This fact caused Justice Powell to say that it "cannot be said
that either the Senate or the House has rejected the President's
claim. . .," and that if "the Congress chooses not to confront the
President, it is not our task to do so."92 In reaching a different
conclusion as to standing, the court of appeals had stressed that,
under the Senate Rules, there was no way the handful of senator-
plaintiffs could force a final vote on the resolution. This perhaps
only emphasizes, however, that Senator Goldwater's grievance was
really with the Senate itself.
As for Senator Kennedy, at first glance it might appear under
the standard suggested here that he should have been ushered out
of court. He had not even tried to pass his legislation in the new
session of Congress, and no court could conclude that such an ef-
fort would be fruitless. However, Senator Kennedy might argue in
response that his injury consisted in having to do over what he
thought had been accomplished the first time, with consequent
diminution in congressional efficiency if not in power.93 He could
say that allowing the executive to double the amount of effort re-
quired to pass legislation through an unconstitutional pocket veto
would be an unsound exercise of judicial discretion, and that there
would be nothing to keep the President from trying that type of
pocket veto again if circumstances allowed. The proper outcome of
the case depends upon the injury of which Senator Kennedy com-
plains: if it was the inability to enact the bill into law, then he
should first have attempted a legislative remedy; if it was the delay
and additional effort, then perhaps the course followed by the
Kennedy court was justifiable. The continuing authority of the
case, in the light of later developments, is at best uncertain.
Five years ago, I said that it "might . . . be unhealthy if the
federal courts come to be regarded as a higher chamber where a
legislator, who has failed to persuade his colleagues. . . can always
renew the battle."9 " Since that time judges and legislators alike
11 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (mem.).
3 See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-36 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (illegal pocket
veto could change legislative balance of power).
" C. McGowan, Congress and the Courts 13 (University of Chicago Law School Occa-
sional Paper No. 10, April 17, 1975).
[Vol. 15:241266
1981] CONGRESSMEN IN COURT 267
have become ever more uneasy about judicial involvement in these
suits. It is surely the duty of judges to say what the law is, but it is
equally true that the separation of powers is part of our supreme
law. It is therefore appropriate for courts to refrain from adjudicat-
ing suits brought by congressional plaintiffs when rendering a deci-
sion upon the merits would pose a greater threat to the constitu-
tional system than would the principled exercise of judicial
restraint.

